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MENAMBAH BAIK KEEFISIENAN PENGESAHSAHIHAN 
SIP BERDASARKAN JADUAL RUJUKAN PRA-HITUNGAN 
ABSTRAK 
 
Telefon IP telah mendapat manfaat yang besar daripada keupayaan yang 
semakin meningkat perkakasan komputer secara umum, termasuk mikropemproses 
yang lebih cepat, memori yang lebih besar kapasiti, dan rangkaian jalur lebar yang 
lebih besar. Sebuah telefon IP tunggal perkapalan pada tahun 2010 mempunyai 
kapasiti pengkomputeran yang jauh lebih daripada kebanyakan daripada PBX awal. 
Trend ini hanya akan terus. 
 Telefon IP menambah memaparkan warna dengan pelayar web besar-
besaran. Ada menambah tertanam Amaran Jangan lupa untuk menyiasat bagaimana 
data disimpan pada sistem tempatan atau mana-mana sistem perantara. Jika, 
misalnya, semua fail log IM chat sesi disimpan dalam jelas, tanpa enkrip teks pada 
komputer tempatan di mana beberapa orang mempunyai akses kepada komputer, 
hakikat bahawa klien IM menyulitkan sesi antara komputer dan pelayan tidak 
melindungi sepenuhnya sesi-sesi.  
Transkrip sesi masih boleh dibaca tempatan oleh sesiapa sahaja yang 
mempunyai akses kepada komputer tempatan. 
Hari ini, sementara masih banyak syarikat mungkin memilih untuk membeli dari 
penjual tunggal demi kemudahan, realitinya adalah bahawa dalam era piawaian 
xiv 
 
protokol kendali seperti Protokol Permulaan Sesi (SIP), syarikat-syarikat tidak lagi 
diperlukan untuk membeli dari yang sama penjual. 
Protokol isyarat ‘Session Initiation Protocol’ (SIP), kebelakangan ini telah 
menjadi keutamaan dalam aplikasi-aplikasi Internet. Perkembangan besar dalam 
perkhidmatan SIP, kebimbangan dalam keselamatan SIP semakin meningkat. 
Oleh itu, pengesahsahian SIP yang terkenal telah dikaji. Dari kajian ini, suatu 
perbaikan pada kriptografi skema terbaru yang dikenali sebagai skema Yoon, yang 
dicadangkan adalah efisien pada keselamatan pengesahsahian SIP tetapi tidak pada 
masa dan pretasi pemprosesan.  
Oleh itu, ia membawa kita untuk memperkenal cara peningkatan skema 
pengesahsahian SIP berdasarkan ‘Elliptic Curve Cryptography’ (EEC) dengan jadual 
rujukan dan pendaraban scalar. 
Malah, hipotesis yang dicadangkan adalah untuk mengatasi dan bandingan 
kos masalah kedua-dua skema pengesahsahian yang dikaji terdahulu. 
Walau bagaimana pun, persoalan disini adalah bagaimana penyelidikan ini 
boleh meningkatkan efisien tanpa kemerosotan pada tahap keselamatan. 
Hasilnya, ECC adalah paling banyak mengguna masa operasi berbanding 
dengan operasi-operasi lain seperti ‘EXCLUSIVE OR’ dan fungsi ‘hash’. 
Pengurangan bilangan ECC dengan pencegahan kemerosotan keselamatan adalah 
sangat penting dan ia akan meningkatkan kelajuan komunikasi dengan kependaman 
yang kurang. 
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IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF SIP 
AUTHENTICATION BASED ON THE PRE-CALCULATED 
LOOK-UP TABLE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
IP phones have benefited greatly from the ever-increasing capabilities of 
computer hardware in general, including faster microprocessors, larger memory 
capacity, and greater network bandwidth. A single IP phone shipping in 2010 has far 
more computing capacity than most of the early PBXs. This trend will only continue. 
IP phones are adding color displays with full-blown Web browsers. Some are adding 
embedded Warning Do not forget to investigate how data is stored on a local system 
or any intermediary system.  If, for instance, all log files of IM chat sessions are 
stored in clear, unencrypted text on a local computer where multiple people have 
access to the computer, the fact that the IM client encrypts sessions between the 
computers and the server does not fully protect those sessions. The session 
transcripts could still be read locally by anyone with access to the local computer. 
Today, while many companies might still choose to buy from a single vendor for the 
sake of convenience, the reality is that in the era of interoperable protocol standards 
like Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), the companies are no longer required to buy 
from the same vendor. The session initiation protocol (SIP) has recently become the 
main signaling protocol for Internet applications. The wide range of SIP services 
raises many concerns on SIP security. Thus, the most popular SIP authentication 
schemes were studied in this paper. The previous cryptographic scheme known as 
Yoon’s scheme proposes SIP authentication that brings efficiency in security but is 
costly in terms of time. Our proposed scheme is an improvement of Yoon’s scheme, 
xvi 
 
as it enhances SIP authentication based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) with 
look-up tables and scalar multiplication. A hypothesis was proposed to overcome and 
compare the cost problems with the two authentication schemes. However, the 
research question is how to make the proposed scheme more efficient without 
decreasing the level of security. Thus, ECC was developed to become the most time-
consuming operation compared with other operations such as “EXCLUSIVE OR” 
and “hash functions.” Decreasing the number of ECC while preventing the degrading 
of security is very important, as it increases the speed of communication and reduces 
latency. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The telecommunications, television, and information technology (IT) network 
industries are all transformed by the Internet. The transformation is driven by the 
need for growth based on new services, more complete global coverage, and 
consolidation.  
With new communications technologies, there is always the temptation to 
mimic the old. E-mail inherited aspects of the interoffice memo and fax; web pages 
attempted to look like newsprint and brochures. However, in VoIP, there is the 
particular temptation to recreate old technology features, as interoperability with the 
old PSTN will remain important for at least another decade. Fax-to-email gateways 
were never quite as important as VoIP-to-PSTN gate-ways. This emphasis on 
interoperability with 100-year-old technology has provided a financial motivation—
provides the same service more cheaply. However, this may also hold back the 
promise offered by Internet-based multimedia communications, such as the 
integration of presence, the ability not just to communicate by voice and maybe 
video but also to share any application, or the ability to customize the user 
experience and integrate interactive communications with existing Internet tools and 
applications. Just as most microprocessors are embedded in household appliances 
and cars, not desktop PCs and laptops, we might find that Internet-based voice and 
multimedia communications will be integrated into games, appliances, and cameras, 
or be hidden behind a link on a web page, rather than dialed by name or number. As 
for many of the most innovative applications, users will likely not even consider 
them phone services at all, but extensions that make some other application more 
productive or more fun. 
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The Internet was originally not reliable enough and lacked the capacity to 
carry voice and video traffic. IP was built around the expectation of unreliable 
connectivity with the ability to recover. Generally there was little or low impact to 
data applications at the time, in the event of momentary/temporary service 
disruption. 
Although the Internet has quickly established itself as the preeminent network 
for data, commercial transactions, and audio-video distribution, the use of voice over 
the Internet has been slower to develop. This has less to do with the capability of the 
Internet to carry voice with equal or higher quality than the telephone network but 
rather with the complex nature of signaling in voice services. 
There are in fact, three come on voice servers over internet, which is based on 
several signaling and control design system. Some examples include the following: 
· Using signaling conception form the telephone industry, for example, 
Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP), Gateway Control Protocol 
(H248) and H323. 
· Using the control concepts from the large telephone enterprises, for 
example, soft switch and central control. 
· Using the internet - centric protocol- session initiation protocol (SIP). 
Meanwhile, circuit switch dedicated communication path between two 
stations. Further, a three main phases for circuit switch which is: establishment, 
transfer and disconnect that must have switching capacity and channel capacity to 
establish connection. In addition it must have intelligence to work out routing figure 
1.1, shows the circuit switch. 
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Figure 1.1: Circuit-switching system. 
 
By contrast, packet-switching protocols are designed for voice resources 
dedicated to a particular call. In the packet-switching system, much more time is 
needed, and a larger amount of data is idle; however, the data rate is fixed, and both 
ends must operate at the same rate. The details of the basic system operation are as 
follows: 
 
• Data transmitted in small packets: 
• Control information: 
• Packets are received, stored briefly (buffered), and passed on to the next node 
— Packets are stored and forwarded. 
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Figure 1.2 illustrates the use of packets.  
 
 
Figure 1.2: Packet –switching network 
Nowadays, the Internet can serve three functions for telecommunication and 
VoIP; through the Internet, we can transmit voice packets, video packets, and both 
voice and video packets (Figure 1.3). 
While, the information technology (IT) network industries, 
telecommunications, televisions are all transformed by the internet. The 
transformation led to growth based on new application servers, more feasible and 
easy to deal with global coverage and conduction. 
 
Figure 1.3: The voice packet transmission 
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SIP is not just another protocol. SIP redefines communications, and is 
impacting the telecom industry to a similar or greater degree than other industries. 
This has been recognized by all telecom service providers and their vendors for 
wired and wireless services as well as in (Figure 1.4) shown all vendors that 
supported SIP. Many networks and service provider see it as a cost-cutting 
proficiency. Furthermore, VoIP infrastructure is an economic foundation on which 
new revenue generating services are invented by the providers.  
 
Latently, envisioned SIP services are termed as converged services. Several 
proficient features, and functions present in existing services have been effectively 
incorporated into these recent SIP services. Certain features have been adapted from 
conventional voice-based telephony services and then combined with features from 
data network services. For example, in using a click-to-dial service, users can control 
telephone calls, SMS, and callbacks via a web browser running on their personal 
computer systems. Converged services offer users new media integration such as 
multimedia conference. This multimedia service allows users to communicate with 
each other via calls with an effective exchange of audio and video information. 
Several new versions of video phones are examples of such transmission. 
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Figure 1.4: SIP distribution and usage 
 
1.1 Background 
 
SIP-based VoIP services have gained popularity compared with other 
supplementary protocols such as the MGCP (e.g., Media Gateway Initiation Protocol 
or H.323) despite their susceptibility to various attacks akin to those active ones on 
the Internet. As a formal way to describe VoIP vulnerabilities has not been 
established, the development of tools required in identifying vulnerabilities or testing 
the security level of offered services is obstructed. These tools are independent from 
specific implementation in both cases. 
 
The SIP (Garcia-Martin, Belinchon, Pallares-Lopez, Canales-Valenzuela, & 
Tammi, 2006) is implemented basically as a signaling protocol to deal with 
multimedia sessions on the Internet and 3G realms. Researchers have proposed 
various security mechanisms for SIP-based infrastructure, yet certain vulnerabilities 
have an impact on this architecture. These vulnerabilities affect the architecture in a 
number of ways, including attempting to deplete available resources, creating fake 
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reactions in response to malicious requests, and trying to discover possible 
vulnerabilities in the application. 
 
The SIP is the preferred signaling protocol in current and future IP telephony 
services, thereby becoming a competitor for traditional telephony services. However, 
the open architecture of the SIP has resulted in the vulnerability of provided services 
to different types of security threats on the Internet, such as spoofing, hijacking, and 
message tampering(Nucci, Ranjan, & Zhang, 2012). 
These attacks could result from misconfiguration on the server or from using 
the default server security policy for the SIP server. A Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
can occur with many VoIP attack tools such as the SIP Crack (McGann & Sicker, 
2005). 
 
1.2 VoIP Encryption 
Signaling and media are the two forms of VoIP encryption. Control channels 
for the SIP or H.323 communications are protected by signaling encryption and the 
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) (Venna, Stratton, Hedayat, Jones, & Kaplan, 
2012) streams used in voice, video, or fax that are protected by media encryption. 
The purpose of the key in signaling encryption is to prevent leakage of sensitive 
information. 
 
Modern SIP specifications offer several approaches in securing signaling. 
One such method is Transport Layer Security (TLS) (Dierks, 2008) ,which an 
identical technique utilized in securing web connections and in encrypting SIP 
signaling from one device to another. However, TLS is unable to ensure top security 
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level for end-to-end encryption. Nonetheless, it introduces a significant provision and 
performance overhead to an SP connection. 
 
The rationality behind this advantage is that TLS can flow only over the 
transmission control protocol (TCP), and a certificate infrastructure is a prerequisite 
to enabling this flow between communicating parties. As such, carrier-grade SIP 
deployments have yet to implement secure TLS signaling. To date, researchers have 
been unaware of carriers offering enterprises with secure signaling or media on SIP 
trunks. 
 
However, In encrypting the body and sensitive headers of an SIP message 
using Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)(Schaad, 2012), and 
certificate-based cryptography, a standard is available for end-to-end SIP signaling 
encryption. However, despite the existence of an SIP standard for S/MIME key 
exchange, its implementation remains complex. Furthermore, this part of the 
standard is hardly supported by SIP products. 
 
Although not commonly supported, the TLS is also an option for H.323 in 
signaling encryption. Parts of the H.323 standard support effective encryption of 
sensitive signaling elements, thus offering efficient signaling encryption without 
using Public Key Interface. 
 
Even though numerous vendors encrypt signaling in their devices, securing 
signaling among H.323 solutions from distinct vendors is extremely difficult. 
Therefore, an extremely effective key exchange mechanism has been proposed for 
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the user agent (UA) server in an SIP environment. Figure 1.5 shows a good example 
of the SIP with public key. 
 
Figure 1.5: Key exchange with public key through SIP proxy server 
 
1.3 Problem Statement  
SIP deployment faces many issues, such as detecting, monitoring, and 
mitigating security threats. It bears the risks of many new ways to attack SIP servers 
and their extensions in enterprises or campuses. 
Although the SIP is grounded from HTTP digest authentication, the protocol 
is still vulnerable to brute force attacks, and weak passwords tend to be identified 
easily using dictionaries. A comparison of results is still possible through the applied 
signature algorithm. The HTTP digest authentication is a good example; it is used in 
several applications because of its extremely convenient implementation and 
exceptional performance. 
However, attackers can effortlessly pick out crucial information about the 
authenticated SIP authority holder. This information can be used to acquire details 
regarding “Log on” and enable the attacker to make calls. 
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Researchers have proposed various schemes for SIP signaling to overcome 
the weakness of VoIP digest authentication. They have tried to address more threats 
by using more cryptography techniques and by increasing the number of 
authentication steps. The consequence of these efforts is more security but less 
efficiency. Thus, a large number of studies have intensively covered the issue on 
attacks but have failed to consider the costs entailed and the inadequate storing for 
cost. A type of balance or enhancement of the encryption world is thus needed. 
Based on the above, a different methodology is adopted in this work, which deserves 
a customized research method. 
 
1.4 Thesis Objective 
The objectives of this study are as follows: 
· To devise this problem by presenting a proposed method to secure, and 
develop the SIP register user server and their clients by considering the 
problem and finding out results. 
· To review and assess current SIP security mechanisms, surveys on the 
hurdles faced by the present SIP security, and the methods used by related 
studies to conquer such hurdles. We hope to initiate a study on SIP to 
prevent security leak. 
· To examine the efficiency of the proposed scheme compared with other 
relevant schemes on SIP confidentiality in terms of cost performance. 
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1.5 Research Contribution 
The primary contribution of this research is the proposal of an improved 
authentication scheme for the SIP that offers significantly more efficient services. 
The goals of the proposed scheme are as follows: 
· Efficiency: To increase the efficiency of the security mechanism by 
identifying costly operations, reducing the number of operations by 
separating them into two groups, namely, off-line and online operations, 
and by then by shifting the operations from the online to the off-line 
group without degrading the level of security. 
· Security: To develop an authentication scheme that increases the level 
of security for SIP clients and their servers. 
· Designing inherently robust and resilient crypto-SIP server and clients    
 
1.6 Thesis Organization  
This research consists of the following six chapters: 
  
1.  Chapter 1: presents a general overview of this thesis. 
 
2.  Chapter 2: briefly introduces the basic underlying concepts, including the 
basics of the SIP, SIP security mechanisms, as well as the nature of different 
kinds of attacks and how they degrade the performance of an SIP system. 
This chapter also reviews the proposed solutions and strategies for solving the 
security issues.  
 
3. Chapter 3: discusses the proposed authentication scheme. 
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4. Chapter 4: presents a comparative analysis of deploying the SIP-based VoIP 
system using our model test scenario. 
 
5. Chapter 5: presents the results and references. 
 
6. Chapter 6: is the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The SIP dominates protocols that establish, modify, and end multimedia 
sessions such as conferences. The SIP is designed for signaling multicast call flow. 
The Request for Comments (RFC) 3261 (Rosenberg et al., 2002) defined by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force is designed specifically for the control of real-time 
multimedia communications. The intention is not to limit the requirement for 
supporting voice calls, but to create a specific control protocol capable of supporting 
all forms of communication. SIP attacks and SIP-related protocol attacks are 
discussed in this chapter. As our focus is security protocol, the number of potential 
attacks on SIP and SIP-related protocols is also discussed, with the importance of 
high security levels considered. 
 
2.2 SIP  
Signaling in telephone systems is the key mechanism by which telephone 
calls are set up and terminated. For example, signaling from a desktop business 
phone tells the PBX to forward the call to another phone. In the public telephone 
network, signaling instructs the switching systems to forward, for example, an 800 
call to a specific call center where an agent will answer the call. 
An example of the value of signaling is the comparison between a telephone 
chat between two residences, and an 800-number call to a customer-support center. 
Such calls are also priced differently. In the end, both phone calls sound the same, 
except that signaling has enabled the adding of commercial value to the 800 number 
calls for a possible business transaction. Signaling defines the desired service for the 
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user, such as point-to-point calls, multipoint conferencing, Centrex services, text, 
voice, and video, and others. 
Thus, the signaling protocol for Internet multimedia real-time 
communications is the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). SIP is one of the most 
famous signaling protocols used to identify signaling encapsulation. The state of 
connection between telephones, or VOIP terminals (IP telephone , PCs and Voice 
over Wireless (VoWLAN) units can be initialized by Signaling ;It is always 
important to understand the voice protocols against the OSI model to situate where 
each protocol fits(Knightson, Morita, & Towle, 2005) and figure 2.1 explain it in 
deeply. 
 
The SIP actually uses HTTP headers that bring many advantages to the SIP, 
including URL dialing and better session routing for all packets. Several programs 
that we use are built on this great technology. 
 
The RFC 3665 lists 11 fundamental session establishment flows (Johnston, 
Donovan, Sparks, Cunningham, & Summers, 2003). This list is not intended to be 
comprehensive, but it covers best practices, that is, “successful session 
establishment” and “session establishment through two proxies.” However, other 
sessions, such as “unsuccessful with no answer” and “unsuccessful and busy,” are 
addressed in the following chapters dedicated to call forwarding. 
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Figure 2.1: SIP location between OSI models 
 
However, SIP messages can also be transferred via wireless networks 
(Schulzrinne & Wedlund, 2000). However, message transfer via such networks also 
suffers from security weakness and leakage on authentication procedures, for 
example, signaling the packages and eavesdropping in the packages and 
eavesdropping by the media between end to end points. 
 
2.2.1 SIP Structure 
SIP messages have two types: “request” and “response.” An SIP request can 
be one of the following: REGISTER, to notify the SIP domain registrar about user 
location; INVITE, to establish a session; BYE, to terminate a session; CANCEL, to 
drop any established session; OPTIONS, to ask another user or server about its 
capabilities; and MESSAGE, to send instant messages. SIP response is the 
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acknowledgment or ACK message used to confirm the receipt of a “200 OK” replies. 
A full SIP message consists of two parts separated by an empty line: header and 
body. All SIP messages, except INVITE and MESSAGE, do not need a body. 
 
In addition, an SIP user needs an address/identifier to communicate with 
others, and this address is written in a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) format 
(Masinter, Berners-Lee, & Fielding, 2005). 
 
2.2.2 Session Description Protocol (SDP) 
The SDP (Handley, Jacobson, & Perkins, 2006) described in RFC 4566 is 
used as a tool to negotiate session parameters between UAs. It is applied in the 
exchange of media details, transport addresses, and other media-related information 
between UAs. The INVITE message usually carries the SDP offer message, whereas 
200 OK contains the response to the INVITE message. 
 
2.2.3 SIP Messages 
The SIP message header consists of two parts, namely, the first line and the 
rest of the header. The first line contains the request type, that is, the Request-URI, 
and the SIP version. The Request-URI should initially have the same value as the 
field, but it can be set to the next hop identifier as well. The first line in a response-
type message includes the response code, as shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Overview of SIP response messages 
Description Status code Example 
Informational 1xx 100 Trying 
Success 2xx 200 Ok 
Redirection 3xx 300 Multiple choices 
Client error 4xx 400 Bad request 
Server error 5xx 502 Bad gateway 
Global failure 6xx 603 Decline 
 
As depicted in the table, SIP response messages have six categories, namely, 
informational response (1xx); success (2xx), which indicates the successful delivery 
of information and request; redirection (3xxx), wherein the user can find alternative 
service by temporarily using proxy if the address has moved permanently; client 
error (4xx), which indicates that the request must proceed through proxy; server error 
(5xx), which refers to server failures; and global failure (6xx), wherein topical 
request cannot respond to the server. 
 
• Requests 
1.  INVITE – to initiate a session. 
 
2.  ACK – to indicate receipt of the corresponding messages. 
 
3.  BYE – to terminate a session. 
 
4.  CANCEL – to stop a previous request. 
 
5.  REGISTER – to send registration details to a registrar. 
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6.  OPTIONS – to query another UA or a proxy server with regard to its 
capabilities. 
 
2.2.4 SIP Call Establishment  
The RFC 3665 (Johnston et al., 2003), provides a detailed description of the 
basic call flow. For example, the calling party “2011” sends an invite request 
message, thereby initiating a message exchange with the destination party “2012” for 
establishing calls. That invite message contains all details of the call or the requested 
session, such as a video conference or an online gaming session(Singh & Acharya, 
2005). 
 
Figure 2.2: Displayed the process of exchange of two SIP messages with each other. 
 
When the invite request is sent by “2011” to “2012,” the request would 
contain the type of requested session, that is, either a video conference or a simple 
online gaming session. 
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2.2.5 SIP Call with a Proxy Server  
Proxy servers are computing devices (typically a server) that interface 
between data processing devices, such as computers, and other devices within a 
communications network. These devices may be located in the same local area 
network or in an external network (Figure 2.3) such as the Internet. A proxy server 
usually has access to at least two communication interfaces. One interface 
communicates with a device that requests services, such as a client and a device that 
request service (the server). 
 
 
Figure 2.3: SIP proxy’s relationship.  
The SIP proxy is the central component of our solution (Stojsic, Radovic, & 
Srbljic, 2001). In Figure 2.4 illustrates an example of a standard SIP call with a 
proxy server that is a type of an SIP server. In the example, Alice made a call to Bob 
via an SIP proxy server. 
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However, the operations of the SIP proxy are not distinct from the HTTP or 
various other Internet protocols. Although this SIP proxy neither establishes nor 
terminates the sessions, it receives and forwards the messages by sitting in the 
middle of an SIP message exchange. This example demonstrates a single proxy, yet 
multiple proxies could exist in a signaling pathway. 
 
Figure 2.4: SIP call with a proxy server. 
 
In SIP authentication requests, a request called “407 Proxy Authentication 
Required” requires certain responses, indicating the need for prior authentication of 
the phone with the proxy server, as the phone would repeat the “INVITE” request 
with a suitable Proxy-Authorization field if not authenticated with the proxy field 
(Figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.5: SIP transaction using authentication server.  
 
Additionally, SIP proxy servers rewrite messages as well as forward and fork 
requests using the following: 
·  Stateful – remembers all requests (Figure 2.6). 
·  Stateless – forgets requests after forwarding (Figure 2.7). 
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Figure 2.6: Stateful register server. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Stateless proxy server.  
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2.3 The RTP 
The RTP (Schulzrinne, Casner, Frederick, & Jacobson, 2003) was 
standardized on RFC 3550. It accounts for the real-time transport of data, including 
audio and video, and employs the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) as the transport 
protocol. The audio and video data need to be packetized by a codec to allow 
transporting.  
Basically, the protocol allows the specification of timing and content 
requirements of the media transmission for the incoming and outgoing packets using 
sequence number, timestamps, and packet forward without retransmission. 
 
2.4 Codecs  
The described contents in RTP protocol are encoded using a codec. Different 
codec’s are designed for specified tasks; some of them possess the ability to compare 
and some may not. 
The most popular codec is G.711 (ITU-T & Switzerland, 1988), (ITU-T & 
Switzerland, 1988), which does not carry out comparisons. It possesses a bandwidth 
of 64 Kbps for a single channel that requires a high-speed network. Such high speed 
is commonly found in local area networks (LANs), as purchasing a 64 Kbps 
bandwidth in a wide area network (WAN) can be too expensive. 
 
2.5 A Survey on SIP 
We studied taxonomy threats and clarified them to develop a framework and 
an overview. Moreover, we surveyed several vulnerabilities and threat mechanism 
issues as well as formulated some clues via high impact studies. VoIP security works 
are then grouped in categories described below. 
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2.5.1 Types of SIP Authentication 
1. The following are the different types of SIP authentication: 
2. Plain text authentication (no secure authentication credentials are sent 
over the channel)  
3. Weak authentication (applied on digest authentication schemes that are 
common nowadays) 
4. Strong authentication scheme (uses S/MIME based on personal 
certificates, but it is complex and costly to implement and is therefore 
impractical from the viewpoint of practical SIP implementation) 
 
2.5.2 The SIP Authentication and Signaling Phase 
SIP UAs register with a proxy server or a registrar. Proxy servers then act as 
an intermediary for SIP calls. SIP server routers that act as SIP gateways can use the 
services of an SIP proxy server either by contacting the server or by receiving 
requests from it. Additionally, UAs can register E.164 numbers with a proxy server 
or a registrar. An established session involves several steps, as shown in Figure 2.8.  
Based on the SIP description provided previously, a hacker requires the SIP 
proxy, router, and gateway to obtain VoIP application privileges. Authentication is 
needed to verify the identity of the party with whom we are communicating. In 
addition, it ensures that what we receive is what they sent (integrity) and prevents 
unauthorized registrations. Thus, the SIP uses an authentication header and phases, 
as follows:  
 
1. Authentication phase between user and server 
 
2. Invite message from user to server /client for establishing session  
